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Executive Summary
This report is intended for:
Policy makers concerned with infectious diseases in humans, animals and plants.
It will also be of interest to a wide range of disease management professionals,
people in industry and business, and researchers in natural and social sciences.
The report takes an international perspective and will therefore be of interest to
governments and non-governmental organisations across the world.
This report has been produced by the UK Government’s Foresight
project: Infectious Diseases: preparing for the future. Foresight is run
by the Office of Science and Innovation under the direction of the
Chief Scientific Adviser to HM Government. Foresight creates
challenging visions of the future to ensure effective strategies now.
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Foreword
Infectious disease affects us all. Human diseases
have a profound effect in countries across the world,
causing premature deaths and disability. In some
countries, HIV/AIDS has contributed to a reduction in
life expectancy to around 40 years. Diseases in
plants and animals act as barriers to economic
development and also threaten ecosystems.
I commissioned this independent scientific study to
asses how the future threats of disease might evolve
over the next 10-25 years, and to assess how
science could help in managing them – specifically
through new systems for disease detection, identification and monitoring. 
The work has looked at both developed and developing countries, with a
particular focus on sub-Saharan Africa.
I would like to mention two important findings. Firstly, infectious diseases are
diverse and dynamic; new outbreaks occur frequently and we are discovering
new infectious agents year on year. This argues the need for policies that are
flexible in relation to an evolving threat, and which can address a wide spectrum
of possible diseases.
Secondly, new detection, identification and monitoring systems could provide a
step-change in our capability to manage diseases in the future. However, this
potential will only be realised if the deployment of the new systems takes careful
account of local systems of culture and governance, and provided the systems
are integrated with effective control measures.
I would like to personally thank the many national and international organisations
that have been involved in this work, as well as the 300 or more experts from
nearly 30 countries. The breadth and depth of perspectives that they have
contributed is, I believe, unprecedented. The findings therefore provide a
considerable body of scientific analysis and fresh insights to inform policy
development by stakeholders at both national and international levels. I therefore
have pleasure in making the full results and work of the project available for the
benefit of all.
Sir David King KB ScD FRS
Chief Scientific Adviser to HM Government, and
Head of the Office of Science and Innovation
vPreface
I am delighted to receive this international Foresight
report from Sir David King. It embodies the use of
excellent science to inform long-term policies for the
management of infectious disease.
We cannot eliminate the risks of infectious diseases,
but we can seek to manage them more effectively.
Here, new systems for detection, identification and
monitoring can play a vital role. Indeed, this project
has shown that future systems could transform our
capabilities for fighting the evolving threat – both in
developing and developed countries.
I particularly welcome the broad perspective of this work – which considers
future diseases in humans, animals and plants. Human and animal diseases are
closely linked since many pathogens have the potential to jump from one species
to another. Also, the control of diseases in livestock and plants are closely linked
to human health, through their effect on economic development and trade.
Sir David’s report has highlighted the key role that science can play in the future
in managing the evolving risks. However, science is not enough in itself. There
are many issues and choices that policy makers and professionals involved with
disease management need to address, to realise the maximum benefit from
these developments. Importantly, this report sets out what those key issues and
choices are.
I am keen to capitalise on the valuable scientific resource the project provides.
I have therefore worked with key players in national and international organisations
to take the findings forward. This project publishes the first steps, setting out
how the findings will be used to inform policy development and investment
strategies. I am particularly pleased that many actions are already well in hand. 
Willy Bach
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Lords):
Sustainable Farming and Food
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
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1 Introduction
The aim of the project
To use the best available science to evaluate the threats of infectious
diseases1 in humans, animals and plants over the next 10-25 years; and
to produce a vision for their management, specifically through systems
for detection, identification and monitoring.
An international approach:
While the UK Office of Science and Innovation commissioned the work, 
it has involved over 300 leading experts and stakeholders from nearly 
30 countries, as well as many international organisations.
An independent scientific look:
The findings are the result of independent scientific analysis – they do 
not constitute the policies of governments or any organisations involved in
the work.
A uniquely broad perspective:
This sets the Foresight project apart from other studies:
• It has looked across diseases in humans, animals and plants.
• It has involved experts from diverse disciplines – from social sciences to
genomics, and from Earth observation to epidemiology.
• It has compared the situation in developing and developed countries –
sub-Saharan Africa and the UK have been used as examples.
1 In this report, ‘infectious diseases’ is taken to include those diseases resulting from infections by transmissible agents
such as viruses, bacteria, fungi and parasites.
3Why the study was needed
Despite some notable successes, the fight against infectious diseases
is far from won. New systems for detection, identification and
monitoring (DIM) could transform our capabilities in managing the
threat – but this will crucially depend on decisions taken today. 
What are the choices and what are their implications?
In recent decades, societies have struggled to manage existing diseases, while,
at the same time, a succession of new and novel pathogens has emerged, such
as HIV, BSE, and cassava mosaic disease. The emergence of drug-resistant
strains has added to the threat.
Science is a powerful tool in the battle. In this project, we have used it to analyse
how the risks could change over the next 10–25 years, and why. And it has
provided a vision of new technology for the fight – DIM systems that could offer
a step-change in capability.
However, realising the benefits of these new systems will depend on many
difficult choices – for governments, stakeholder organisations, and for the public.
Issues of regulation, governance, ethics, and civil liberties will all be important.
Defining ‘detection’, ‘identification’ and ‘monitoring’ (DIM)
Outbreaks of infectious disease can spread rapidly, causing enormous
losses to health and livelihood. The best strategy is to stop their
spread at an early stage, or prevent them altogether.
To do this, we rely on very early detection of the appearance of disease or
disease-causing agents. Rapid and accurate identification of these agents is
essential if we are to stop outbreaks with the correct control measure, for
instance, antimicrobials or vaccines. This is particularly true for entirely new
diseases, where we find ourselves in a race to develop new controls as the
disease spreads. In outbreak situations and control programmes, monitoring of a
known problem will involve the same systems of detection and identification and
is important, as it informs where to focus effort.
2 The threat of infectious diseases – 
today and in the future
Q1 What is the threat of infectious diseases today?
Q2 What is the vision of our world leaders for infectious diseases 
in the future?
Q3 How might the threat evolve over the next 25 years?
Q4 What major epidemics might emerge in the future and how 
bad might they be?
Q5 What factors will drive changes in risk?
Q6 How might climate change impact on infectious diseases?
52 The threat of infectious diseases
– today and in the future
This chapter examines how the threat of infectious diseases
could evolve over the next 10–25 years, using the present
day as a baseline. It looks at both the UK and sub-Saharan
Africa, and also considers factors driving changes in risk.
Important categories of future diseases are identified, paying
particular attention to new and emerging diseases. These are
of special concern, since they imply the need for disease
management policies that are both flexible and adaptable.
The effect of climate change is also considered, taking a 
75-year horizon.
Infectious Diseases: preparing for the future
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2 The threat of infectious diseases – today and
in the future
Q1 What is the threat of infectious diseases today?
Infectious diseases in humans now threaten us all – and with our
assistance, can cross the globe in hours. Worldwide, they account 
for over a fifth of human deaths and a quarter of morbidity. 
They disproportionately affect the poor – in some African countries,
they have contributed to reducing life expectancy to around 40 years.
When diseases attack crops and livestock, they can undermine
economic development and cause humanitarian crises. Plant diseases
account for 10–15% of losses to crop production worldwide, and hit
developing countries particularly hard. Livestock diseases also impact
on rich countries – the 2001 outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD)
in the UK cost around £7 billion – more than the National Health
Service spends on all human infectious diseases in a year.
Table 2.1 gives an indication of the scale of the
impact of infectious diseases in humans,
animals and crops. However, these figures
cannot convey the devastating human
consequences resulting from famine and
displaced populations. HIV alone has created
over 3 million orphans in sub-Saharan Africa.
In addition to known diseases, unknown
diseases are also emerging, some of which
are associated with new and serious disease
problems, such as SARS in human populations
or BSE in cattle. The emergence of drug-resistant strains is also a problem – 
20 years ago we thought that we were winning the fight against tuberculosis, but
drug-resistant strains have now emerged.
Animal diseases can cause substantial economic costs to developed countries
(Table 2.1), but their effects are most severe in sub-Saharan Africa, which shares
the greatest burden of animal diseases worldwide. Here, livestock farming
contributes 25% to the gross national product across the region, but 12 of the
world’s 15 major epidemic diseases of animals are endemic (in the former List A
of the World Organization for Animal Health – the OIE (Office Internationale des
Épizooties)). In contrast, all are exotic to the UK.
Four staples – rice, maize, wheat and potatoes – make up half of the global
supply of food crops. Epidemic diseases that affect these can pose global
threats, threatening national food supplies and economic security. The recent 
Fig 2.1: Children in particular,
suffer the consequences of
infectious diseases
2 The threat of infectious diseases – today and in the future
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re-emergence and spread of wheat stem rust in east Africa, which had
devastating impacts in the 20th century, exemplifies such a threat.
Table 2.1: Examples of the impacts of diseases on humans, animals and plants
Q2 What is the vision of our world leaders for infectious diseases in
the future?
The eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) provide a vision of
the world our leaders would like to see in 2015. Infectious diseases
crucially affect four, which relate to human health, food supply and
economic development. For these, progress has been poor: in Africa the
situation has remained unchanged or has even deteriorated. Across
the world, many of the individual targets are not on-course to be met.
Table 2.2 details current progress against targets set for four MDGs that are
particularly relevant to infectious diseases – three geographical regions have been
selected for comparison. The colour coding provides an indication of progress,
and the likelihood of achieving the targets by 2015, if current trends persist.
Examples of plant disease outbreak, with costs
Southern corn leaf
blight, USA
1970
Soybean rust, Brazil
2001–2004
Groundnut rosette
virus, sub-Saharan
Africa
1900 to present
Cassava mosaic
disease, Uganda
1990–2000
£0.6 billion losses in a
single year
£3 billion in accumulated
losses since introduction
in 2001
15 episodes, with
losses of up to £200
million per epidemic
£40 million lost annually
from this new virus
variant
Examples of animal disease outbreaks, with costs
BSE, United
Kingdom
1996/1997
FMD, Chinese
Province of
Taiwan
1997
Classical 
swine fever,
Netherlands
1997/98
FMD, UK
2001
Avian
influenza,
Vietnam
2003/2004
Avian
influenza,
Netherlands
2003
£2.3 billion £4 billion £1.4 billion £7 billion £0.32 billion £0.4 billion
Mortality for major human diseases – worldwide deaths in 2004
(derived from the Statistical Annex of the 2004 World Health Report (WHO))
Lower
respiratory
tract infections
HIV/AIDS Diarrhoeal
disease
Tuberculosis Malaria Childhood
infections2
6.8%
4.0 million
4.9%
2.8 million
3.2%
1.8 million
2.7%
1.6 million
2.2%
1.3 million
2.0%
1.1 million
2 Pertussis, poliomyelitis, diphtheria, measles, tetanus.
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It is striking how many of the MDGs relate to infectious diseases, and how many
are not currently on course to succeed. This argues strongly for reassessing 
the role and priority given to the management of infectious diseases in meeting
the MDGs.
Table 2.2: Progress in Millennium Development Goals that relate to infectious diseases
Source: UN (September 2005) Millennium Development Goals: Progress Chart. DPI/2363 Rev.2. September 2005.
Q3 How might the threat evolve over the next 10-25 years?
While there is great uncertainty about the future, we should expect
many of today’s major human and animal infectious diseases to
broadly continue in importance – indeed, it could be decades before
some, like HIV, will peak. However, we should also expect diverse
diseases to continue to emerge or re-emerge. Infectious diseases 
will continue to jump between wild and domesticated animal species
and humans.
The emergence of drug-resistant strains in diseases of humans and
animals, and biocide-resistant strains in plant diseases, will be
particularly important – as will the spread of diseases to new areas
due to increased travel, migration and trade.
No progress, or a deterioration or
reversal
Target not expected to be met by
2015 if existing trends persist
Target expected to be met by
2015 if prevailing trends persists;
or not considered important in 
the region
Millennium
Development 
Goal
Specific target Sub-
Saharan
Africa
Southern
Asia
Europe
Goal 1:
Eradicate
extreme
poverty and
hunger
Reduce extreme poverty by half
Reduce extreme hunger by half
Goal 4:
Reduce child
mortality
Reduce mortality of under 5s by 
two-thirds
Goal 5:
Improve maternal
health3
Reduce maternal mortality by 
three-quarters
Goal 6:
Combat HIV,
malaria and
other
diseases
Halt and reverse spread of HIV/AIDS
Halt and reverse spread of malaria
Halt and reverse spread of tuberculosis
3 The available data for maternal mortality does not allow trend analysis. Progress represented in this chart has been
assessed by responsible agencies using proxy indicators.
2 The threat of infectious diseases – today and in the future
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The great majority of emerging and
re-emerging human infectious
diseases have originated from
animal sources. It is therefore
expected that the animal reservoir,
particularly in wild animals, will be
an important and continuing source
of infectious diseases in both
livestock and humans, due to
incursions into natural habitats and
the trade in meat and exotic
animals for food and pets.
HIV, tuberculosis and malaria will
continue to impose a huge public
health burden, particularly in developing countries, and may become more
difficult to control. For example, 20 years ago it was thought that the battle
against tuberculosis was being won. But it is re-emerging, driven by the HIV
epidemic and the emergence of drug resistance. Epidemic diseases, such as
influenza, will continue to be a threat, and new diseases will continue to emerge.
We are currently identifying one or two new human pathogens every year. 
Most new pathogens will have their origins in animal reservoirs.
For livestock in the UK, it is expected that certain important diseases will remain
endemic, for example, bovine tuberculosis. Also, there are new diseases yet to
be controlled e.g. porcine respiratory and reproductive syndrome. There is also a
concern that the great livestock plagues, such as those in Africa, may be
introduced into other countries in
the future. In Africa, animal
diseases of continuing importance
are likely to include contagious
bovine pleuropneumonia, peste des
petits ruminants and FMD – the
latter being the most transmissible
and greatest impediment to
international market access by sub-
Saharan-African countries.
For plants, there is evidence that
new diseases are entering countries
at a growing rate. In the past
century in Europe, the number of
new plant diseases established
each decade has increased.
However, this growth has not been
Fig 2.2: A wide selection of bushmeat for sale
Fig 2.3: Cassava severely damaged by the
virulent form of mosaic disease in Uganda
at the height of the epidemic in the mid-1990s
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apparent in Africa, perhaps because this continent is still to experience a trade-
driven burst of new diseases, or more worryingly, because national capacity to
detect and diagnose new diseases declined during the last century. Besides the
introduction of new diseases, new and virulent plant diseases are arising from
local mixing and evolution of strains, such as cassava mosaic disease in 
east Africa.
Q4 What major epidemics might emerge in the future and how bad
might they be?
No one knows what major diseases may arise in the future – HIV and
BSE were novel and took us by surprise. We need policies that are
flexible and that can cope with the unexpected. New science may be
able to give us some clues of what might be around the corner, but
detecting an unusual event in a disease monitoring system might be
our first sight of a major epidemic.
Diseases that produce major epidemics are often fast-spreading. However, novel
and slow-moving diseases that show no symptoms for many years can be just as
catastrophic – HIV is a good example. We do not know how many such diseases
are already at large and hidden in the human and animal populations.
Major new diseases will affect developing and developed countries in very
different ways. In the former, the new diseases could spread unchecked due to a
lack of the basic resources to manage even existing diseases. Similarly, when
Eight important future disease categories
The project experts identified eight classes of disease that were considered
particularly important in the next 10–25 years, and where future DIM
systems have the potential to make a difference. This list is not intended to
be exhaustive, but is considered to be both thorough and diverse in the
future challenges it presents for disease management:
1 New pathogen species and novel variants
2 Pathogens acquiring resistance
3 Diseases that cross between animal species to humans (zoonoses)
4 HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria
5 Epidemic plant diseases
6 Acute respiratory infections
7 Sexually transmitted infections
8 Animal diseases that cross national boundaries (‘transboundary’)
2 The threat of infectious diseases – today and in the future
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they affect crops and livestock, the inability to eradicate the disease from the
country could severely prejudice economic development and trade.
In developed countries around the world, there is a danger that a major epidemic
could reach a tipping point in compromising essential services and business. 
We will see later in this report how future DIM systems could play an important
role within wider disease management strategies, in helping to prevent such
tipping points being reached.
Q5 What factors will drive changes in risk?
For human, animal and plant diseases, it is not just the virulence of the
disease and its ease of transmission that are important. How the
disease interacts with patterns of behaviours and movements of
people, and with how we manage our livestock and crops are also
crucial. So, some of the new threats of the future could be driven as
much from changes in human behaviour and animal husbandry and
agriculture, as from new pathogens emerging from the wild.
Several socio-economic effects were found to be consistently important for the
UK and Africa, and across humans, animals and plants:
• Increasing travel, migration and
trade: these promote both the spread
of existing diseases to new populations
and regions and also facilitate the
emergence of new diseases by bringing
different populations into contact with
each other.
• Exotics: increasing levels of tourism in
remote areas, growing importation of
alien plants for gardens and exotic
animals as pets, and consumption of
novel foods such as bushmeat are all
facilitating the introduction of new
diseases from wild species.
• Drug use leading to drug-resistant organisms: this results, for example,
from the use of adulterated drugs, failure to complete courses of treatment,
and inaccurate diagnosis.
In Africa, many more factors were considered to have a larger effect on disease
risks than in the UK. Such factors include: poverty; conflicts; systems of
governance; changing patterns of land use (particularly urbanisation); shifting
agricultural practices towards intensification; and the lack of capacity.
Fig 2.4: Increasing travel will promote
the spread of diseases to new populations
Infectious Diseases: preparing for the future
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For the UK, other important factors affecting future disease risks include: the
implementation of international systems of disease surveillance and control; lack
of new pesticides for crops, and of drugs and vaccines for animals; and the
amount of illegal imports.
China was the subject of a case study to investigate how future changes in
society might affect human diseases. The insight provided by this work also has
relevance to other parts of the world – see box on China for the key results.
All of the factors mentioned above are uncertain and interact in complex ways.
This makes their combined effect on infectious diseases increasingly uncertain
the further one looks into the future – how could anyone have predicted that
worldwide drug trafficking, sex tourism and the bushmeat trade in Africa 
would all have played a role in today’s epidemic of HIV/AIDS? However, some of
the factors are the responsibility of governments acting alone or through
international bodies. So, governments could, in principle, develop long-term
approaches to managing these factors, with a view to reducing uncertainty and
also disease risks.
Q6 How might climate change impact on infectious diseases?
Over the next 75 years, climate change is likely to have most impact
on diseases that are vector-borne – i.e. carried by insects. In the UK,
there is no imminent threat to the population, although climate
change will make the climate marginally more favourable for diseases
such as malaria. However, for livestock and crops, the picture will be
mixed, with some diseases increasing and some decreasing in risk. In
Africa, the effects will be greater because: insect-borne diseases are
already much more important there; climate change is expected to
alter the geographical ranges of some of these diseases; and there are
likely to be limitations in health infrastructure.
The UK is already at the edge of a zone of increased risk of bluetongue virus.
This affects sheep and cattle and has spread through southern Europe because
of recent climate warming in the region. Plants will also be at greater risk of
vector-borne disease as mild winters and warm springs favour the survival and
early development of the aphid vectors of numerous pathogens. In some
instances, however, very hot and dry summers may reduce threats, for example,
where the relevant vectors are water-sensitive – e.g. the liver fluke (fascioliasis).
2 The threat of infectious diseases – today and in the future
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One of the ways insects (and the diseases
they carry) gain entry to the UK is by stowing
away on boats and, to a lesser extent, on
aircraft. The frequency of successful
introductions of this type may increase in the
short term with climate change.
Africa, where people, animals and crops live in
conditions of much greater moisture stress,
rising temperature will be important, but less
so than changes to rainfall patterns and the
frequency of droughts.
Many vector-borne diseases such as malaria
and sleeping sickness are major causes of
human suffering in Africa. And tsetse- and
tick-borne diseases such as trypanosomiasis
are major constraints on livestock production
and contributors to poverty. Climate change is
expected to alter the distributions of some or all of these diseases. For example,
the tsetse fly vectors of trypanosomiasis are predicted to alter their distributions
by 2030 in response to climate change, some losing their footholds at the
southern and northern extremes of their ranges, but some expanding into parts
of east and west Africa.
Climate change will also have many indirect effects on infectious diseases,
particularly in Africa. For example, it could force patterns of agriculture to change,
causing localised famine, displacing populations, and fuelling conflict over scarce
resources such as water. All of these will affect the emergence and spread of
disease, particularly in animals and humans.
Fig 2.5: An opportunity for insect
disease vectors to stow away
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The threat of infectious diseases to ecosystems
Infectious diseases are natural components of ecosystems, contributing to
biodiversity and to their dynamic stability over time. However, when natural
ecosystems are stressed, disease outbreaks may become more frequent
and may have longer-term negative impacts, both on the ecosystems and
potentially on society, as most natural ecosystems provide services, such
as clean water and air, recreation, tourism, and the ‘existence value’
of biodiversity.
The greatest hazard to ecosystems arises when diseases affect keystone
species that are important to ecosystem function, such as top predators,
whose removal may lead to population explosion of herbivores and
the overexploitation of plants. In an already stressed ecosystem, these
effects may be aggravated, and a capacity to return to pre-disease
structure and function reduced. Examples of stressed ecosystems today
include over-fished marine systems; overgrazed grasslands and
overexploited forests.
During the next 20 years, environmental degradation is likely to continue
due to pollution, overproduction, habitat fragmentation and alien species
invasions, while the economic value placed on natural ecosystems,
particularly in developed countries, will increase.
Perhaps the greatest potential ecosystem-level impact of a new disease
would be to undermine global water and geochemical cycles by disrupting
the key plant and microbial systems that support them. The probability of
this is regarded as very low at present. It is much more likely that new
diseases in natural ecosystems will reduce the local abundance and
diversity of species 
and the ecosystem 
services they provide.
Natural ecosystems 
will, on the other hand,
continue to be a major
source of wildlife 
diseases that may 
threaten agricultural 
systems and 
human health.
Fig 2.6: Rainforest deforestation
2 The threat of infectious diseases – today and in the future
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Infectious diseases in China – a changing country
Important factors affecting the future risk of disease
Around 40 Chinese experts identified the most important factors that
would affect the future risk of infectious diseases in animals and humans
in the country:
• increasing movements of people, animals and animal products around the
country and internationally
• more and greater internal migrations of people
• increasing tourism – from and to China
• increasing amounts of animal waste – causing problems for disposal
• changing sexual lifestyles – these are expected to change in ways that
increase the risk of acquiring and transmitting diseases
• changing public attitudes – acceptance of risks from infectious diseases
will decline significantly, and there would be greater public demands for
safety and protection
• an increase in genetic uniformity in crops and animals
• overall rises in wealth and levels of education.
Many of these factors are similar to those identified for the UK and Africa.
Changing disease risks
The Chinese experts then looked
at the trends in the above drivers,
and evaluated what these would
mean for the future threat of
infectious diseases. They 
concluded that, if the expected 
trends materialise, and in the 
absence of countermeasures, the 
rates of the following are likely 
to rise:
• infections acquired during hospitalisation or from healthcare clinics
• antimicrobial-resistant organisms
• sexually transmitted infections including HIV
• blood-borne viruses associated with high technology care (hepatitis B and C)
• some food-borne infections
• zoonoses in general
• imported and exotic infections.
Fig 2.7: China – a changing country
3 Options for responding to future challenges 
– DIM systems
Q7 Why are DIM systems likely to be important in managing 
diseases in the future?
Q8 What are the potential benefits of the future DIM systems?
Q9 What are the most important factors influencing the effective
realisation of the future DIM systems?
17
3 Options for responding to future
challenges – DIM systems
This chapter considers the key roles that future DIM
systems could play in managing the evolving threats
identified in Chapter 2. In particular, it discusses their
contribution in wider disease management systems and
provides a broad indication of the benefits they might
provide. The issues affecting the effective implementation of
the future DIM systems are also discussed.
Infectious Diseases: preparing for the future
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3 Options for responding to future challenges –
DIM systems
Q7 Why are DIM systems likely to be important in managing
diseases in the future?
Future DIM systems could offer powerful tools for disease
management within wider strategies of control. For example,
advanced data collection and processing could enable emerging
diseases to be quickly spotted, providing valuable time to develop
vaccines or to stop their spread in other ways. New techniques for
identifying and analysing new pathogens could help us quickly
understand how the newly detected diseases will affect populations,
and how they could be controlled before widespread damage is
caused. And faster, smaller and cheaper diagnostic devices will 
open up entirely new possibilities for use by professionals and 
the individual.
Future DIM systems only provide information, and therefore will only yield
benefit when linked to timely and effective disease management measures and
when properly embedded in disease management infrastructure. However, the
information they provide makes three things possible:
• buying time: in a potential pandemic of an acute
respiratory infection, there is a race between the
production and delivery of vaccine and the spread
of the virus. Early containment of an epidemic
could potentially make more time available for the
development and production of a vaccine.
• enabling more effective and more efficient
targeting of resources: spotting a new emerging
disease in its very early stages, for example, by
advanced data analysis, could enable resources to
be tightly focused and an outbreak to be stopped in its tracks. Alternatively,
routine on-the-spot diagnosis of a drug-resistant strain of a disease in a GP’s
surgery could enable the most appropriate treatment to be provided
immediately – this would reduce the need for repeat consultations and save
the costs of inappropriate drugs.
• opening up new possibilities for disease management: a cheap self-
diagnostic device to test sexually transmitted diseases, available from
pharmacies in the future, could enable many people who would not normally
visit a genito-urinary clinic to test themselves at home. This could bring testing
and diagnosis to a large section of the population who have asymptomatic
Fig 3.1: Vaccine production
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diseases, which, left undiagnosed, could lead to severe health complications
and costly treatment. However, such new possibilities are unlikely to be
straightforward – many issues will need to be considered and balanced.
Q8 What are the potential benefits of the future DIM systems?
It is impossible to quantify the benefit of future DIM systems with
accuracy. This is because their use and effectiveness will depend on
many uncertain factors such as future public attitudes and future
systems of governance. However, the project has constructed pen-
pictures of the use of new DIM systems 10-25 years in the future.
These have been used to illustrate issues surrounding their use, and to
consider the benefits they might yield. Whilst these examples are only
intended to be illustrative, they have shown that when linked to
effective control measures, the new DIM systems could potentially
enable substantial reductions in deaths and morbidity, or considerable
cost savings.
User Challenges: broad classes of DIM system
The project considered four important classes of DIM system for detailed
analysis – these are termed ‘User Challenges’ (UCs):
• UC1: novel information technology for the capture, analysis and modelling
of data for the early detection of infectious disease events
• UC2: early detection and characterisation of new or newly 
resistant/virulent pathogens using genomics and post-genomics
• UC3: taking technology for the identification and characterisation of
infectious diseases to individuals by designing smart swabs, or portable
hand-held devices (e.g. that analyse fluids)
• UC4: high-throughput screening for infectious diseases of people, animals
and plants using surrogate, non-invasive markers (e.g. electromagnetic
radiation, volatile organic compounds), for example, in airports, sea/road
containers and livestock markets.
Further details of the User Challenges may be found in report D1.
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The following list indicates the benefits that could potentially result from the use
of particular future DIM systems, used in association with effective control
measures (further details of the examples may be found in project report D1:
A Vision of Future Detection, Identification and Monitoring Systems). While the
pen-picture examples are purely hypothetical and illustrative, and designed to
provoke thought, rather than being predictions, the figures provided below are
considered to give a broad indication of the possible benefits:
• In a new influenza emerging in 2025, a range of future DIM systems reduces
UK mortality from a pandemic by ten-fold.
• In a SARS outbreak in 2015, a new diagnostic test saves £230 million of
healthcare costs in an outbreak in a major city.
• In 2015, a new bio-sensor diagnostic device helps to protect UK native
woodlands with an estimated value of £1–2 billion per year from diseases such
as sudden oak death.
• In 2015, a hand-held diagnostic device for a range of sexually transmitted
diseases saves the NHS £135 million per year for chlamydia and gonorrhoea
alone. The consequential benefits of reducing HIV transmission would be
much greater, at £0.5–1 billion lifetime savings for every 1,000 HIV
transmissions prevented.
• In an outbreak of FMD in
2015, DIM systems virtually
eliminate the need for mass
culling and reduce costs of
controlling the epidemic from
£5 billion to £50 million.
Other losses (tourism,
rural trade etc.) are reduced
from £3 billion to £35 million.
• In 2015, bluetongue reaches
the UK. A DIM system using
satellite data combined with
modelling enables savings in
vaccinations of £7 million.
Fig 3.2: A burning pyre during the 
outbreak of FMD in the UK in 2001
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Q9 What are the most important factors influencing the effective
realisation of the future DIM systems?
The new DIM systems will need to meet two key requirements:
• They need to be embedded in wider strategies and infrastructure for
disease management, and linked to an effective response. Otherwise,
the DIM information would only fuel public expectations for action
and public concerns if action did not result.
• The development and implementation of the DIM systems needs to be
embedded within local systems of culture, governance and in public
attitudes. This implies the need to adopt an interdisciplinary approach
in their development and implementation – although achieving this
is currently impeded by institutional and academic boundaries.
An African perspective on future DIM systems
The potential benefits
• Africa has the greatest burden of disease and probably the lowest level
of disease management resources in the world. This implies the need
for precise and effective targeting of resources, in which DIM systems
could play a crucial role.
• New DIM approaches could reduce costs and make DIM devices
simpler and easier to use. For example, high-tech diagnostic dipsticks
could help reduce the need for highly trained personnel. Also, remote
sensing from satellites coupled with disease modelling could help
predict outbreaks of disease without difficult on-the-ground monitoring.
• New diagnostic devices could also make trading easier by enabling
disease-free status of animals to be demonstrated on the spot.
The potential pitfalls
• There is a danger that the firms and organisations developing new DIM
systems will target the diseases of most relevance to rich countries,
thereby neglecting diseases of interest to Africa.
• There is also a danger that the new devices would not work in the
environment in developing countries – for example, needing power or
refrigeration, or trained operating staff.
• There is a substantial African concern that certain countries might
sometimes use disease inappropriately as an instrument for imposing 
and justifying trade barriers. It would be important to ensure that the 
new DIM systems were not used for that purpose.
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There is a need to integrate future DIM systems effectively within the wider
systems and infrastructure for disease control. For example, when a new disease
outbreak is detected, it may be necessary to immediately switch on commercial
vaccine production or other control strategies. This suggests the value of
planning for the integration of future DIM systems at the outset. However, this is
a considerable challenge as it would involve governments and public and private
stakeholders operating both nationally and internationally.
There was a strong consensus from project experts that future DIM systems
needed to be embedded in local systems of culture and governance if they were
to be practical and effective. Indeed, issues such as ethics, public attitudes and
public acceptability could be critical. However, creating interdisciplinary research
programmes to achieve that would be difficult since they tend to cut across
existing institutional partitions. Therefore, it would be useful for research bodies
to consider how such interdisciplinary work could be better promoted.
Implications of this report for counterterrorism
The DIM systems that have been analysed in this project have been
considered against the threats identified in the project (see project report
T1, Future Threats). These generally cover non-deliberate release and do
not cover terrorism. Certainly such deliberate releases are important and
need to be given careful consideration. However, it was considered that
other bodies were better placed to make informed comment on the size
and character of the terrorist threat – particularly those with access to
classified intelligence.
Nevertheless, it is considered that many of the DIM systems that have
been identified and analysed in this project will be broadly useful for
counterterrorism. For example, a hand-held diagnostic device would work
equally well on a given virus whether it has been maliciously released or
not. Moreover, some of the future science and technology identified
could open up new and innovative approaches.
However, it is recognised that the detailed design and implementation of
the DIM systems might need to be modified to maximise their
effectiveness within a counterterrorist context. For example, hand-held
devices might need to look for a different set of pathogens compared
with ‘normal’ use, and algorithms to detect a deliberate release (as
opposed to non-deliberate) might need to be modified to account for
possible differences in the pattern of release/emergence. There is
therefore a case for experts concerned with counterterrorism to discuss
the detailed findings of this project with key project experts with a view
to examining such issues and maximising technology transfer.
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Q10 What strategic choices will condition future disease 
management and DIM systems?
Q11 What are the choices for governance and regulation?
Q12 What are the choices for standards and interoperability?
Q13 How can we best exploit exogenous developments?
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Q16 What are the implications for technology and systems?
Q17 What are the implications for skills?
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4 Key choices for policy makers
There are many important issues that will affect the
development of the future DIM systems, their effectiveness
when implemented, and the public good that will result.
These issues, in turn, imply choices for government, 
disease management stakeholders, and the general public.
This chapter explores those choices and their implications.
Infectious Diseases: preparing for the future
26
4 Key choices for policy makers
The DIM systems of the future cannot be considered in isolation, but need to be
viewed in the context of their use in wider systems for disease management.
Therefore, at the highest level, the fundamental choices that need to be made
are as much about our broad strategies for managing diseases as they are about
individual DIM systems.
Q10 What strategic choices will condition future disease management
and DIM systems?
Across the world, the management of diseases is predicated on three
major factors. Firstly, the emphasis is on being reactive – managing
existing or imminent threats. Should we be more proactive and
strategic, recognising the many diverse disease threats that are
expected to emerge in the future? Secondly, there is extreme disparity
between disease management and DIM capabilities in different parts
of the world. If we want to tackle diseases quickly wherever they arise,
can we afford for this disparity to continue? Thirdly, there is a lack of
coherence between disease management programmes across the
world. There are many vertical programmes targeting single diseases.
Should we collectively seek a more joined-up approach?
Should our strategies for managing diseases, and therefore our DIM
systems, be more pro-active? We expect that diverse new diseases will
emerge in the future, so it makes sense to develop flexible policies and DIM
systems for managing them. This implies the need for a policy shift and taking
difficult decisions – towards taking a long-term view and allocating resources for
tackling future unknowns. However, stakeholders are inevitably pressurised to
address immediate threats. This shifts attention and resources to the near term.
Should we aim to tackle new disease outbreaks where they emerge?
It makes sense to stamp on new epidemics quickly at source. For example,
modelling has shown that the emergence of a human pandemic form of influenza
could only be prevented if it is detected at a very early stage and appropriate
control measures quickly implemented. However, early detection of new
diseases can be particularly difficult in developing countries, where there may be
a lack of resources and skills. This implies the need for the international
community to help developing countries to bring their DIM capabilities up to a
more even international standard. This would benefit everyone.
How to achieve a more coherent approach to managing existing diseases?
Vertical programmes that target a single disease have the benefit of providing a
sharp focus. However, they can also result in the duplication of scarce DIM
resources and existing capacity being thinly spread. Also, such vertical
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organisation does not sit well with the reality that many diseases interact with
each other – for example, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis – and should therefore be
considered together. For DIM systems, this vertical integration can result in a
costly monitoring network being set up to track a single disease (as happened
initially for rinderpest in livestock and polio in humans), even though it might be
cost-effective to monitor other diseases. However, moving towards a more
coherent approach would constitute a major shift in policy in some donor and
stakeholder organisations.
Should we make a co-ordinated, international effort to improve existing
disease surveillance? While developed countries such as the UK make a
significant investment in disease surveillance, there are still many gaps in our
knowledge, even of human diseases. We have almost no systematic information
on diseases in wild animals or plants, and limited data on diseases of livestock,
pets and crops. In many parts of the world, the situation is far worse, with sparse
information on even the major human diseases, and data on animal and plant
diseases may be virtually non-existent. Organisations such as the World Health
Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the OIE
perform a great deal of valuable work in disease surveillance. We could collectively
seek to build on such success and improve disease surveillance further.
Do we need a new global infrastructure? Many regions of the world do not
have the laboratory infrastructure, the human resources or the financial resources
to support effective disease surveillance programmes. Yet it is increasingly clear
that infectious diseases are a global problem and that surveillance is an
international responsibility. Investment by richer countries in surveillance capacity
in poorer countries may be a sensible response to this problem.
Should we link DIM work that targets human, animal and plant diseases?
Reference has already been made to the way in which human, animal and plant
diseases interact to affect human health and economies. For example, today, the
growth in zoonotic threats compels us to better integrate human and animal
disease research and surveillance. However, responsibility for human, animal and
plant health is historically segregated. Even in agriculture, animal and plant health
systems are usually quite separate and take different approaches to disease risks.
As a result, DIM innovation in any one of these sectors may not be shared with
other sectors, despite the convergence of genomic, information and modelling
science which creates common DIM technology for a range of diseases.
An illustration of the benefits of better linkages has arisen from this project. It is a
new initiative in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)
to develop a ‘biosecurity chip’ – a disease-identification technology based on a
portable microarray DNA system which will identify priority diseases of both
animals and plants.
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Q11 What are the choices for governance and regulation?
While there is great uncertainty in the future threats of infectious
diseases, there is much that governments, policy makers and
international organisations can do to prepare. Many of the key choices
for governance and regulation are about recognising the need to tackle
infectious diseases in a joined-up way.
How to forge better strategic linkages between the human and animal
stakeholder communities? 75% of emerging and re-emerging human
pathogens are also present in animals. This argues strongly for sustainable and
strategic linkages to be further developed between the two communities. This is
beginning to happen. For example, the WHO, the OIE and the FAO are currently
seeking to co-ordinate their GLobal Early Warning (and response) Systems
(GLEWS) for disease outbreaks. However, much more could usefully be done.
A consistent message was the importance of high-level political encouragement.
How to better address the
monitoring of the wild animal
reservoir? Avian Influenza (AI)
illustrates the need to monitor
diseases in wild animals – because
they can also affect livestock, and
because they can jump into humans.
AI has stimulated considerable
monitoring of wildfowl; however this
masks underlying systemic
deficiencies. Organisations such as
the OIE collate data on wild animals
from some countries. However, those
data may lack a baseline against
which they can be assessed, their
collection is rarely part of an active surveillance programme and many countries
do not collect such data. Improving the monitoring of wild animals would rest on
three principles: making better use of existing data; focusing monitoring better; and
ensuring that the mandates and resources of key organisations match the need.
How to regulate self-diagnostic devices in order to avoid the pitfalls?
Consumer electronics firms are already developing hand-held diagnostic devices.
These will be of value to professionals – but they raise issues about how their
more widespread availability could or should be enabled and controlled in the
future. There are three particularly important issues:
• It will be vital for professionals to maintain access to diagnostic information.
This might be partly achieved by insisting on professional consultation for
treatment, or by engineering devices to automatically relay diagnostic
information by a radio link.
Fig 4.1: Monitoring wild animal populations
presents particular challenges
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• People might seek to self-treat themselves or treat (or dispose of) their
animals. This would act to sever patient/doctor and farmer/vet links and could
undermine measures to control epidemics. It might also result in inappropriate
or adulterated treatment being used – fuelling drug resistance.
• Hand-held devices will inevitably generate medical or veterinary waste. 
Safe disposal will be an important consideration when regulating the use of
such devices.
• Provision of information, advice and support is likely to be important for those
using the tests, particularly if the diseases diagnosed are serious and have
substantial implications for individuals, their partners or their families.
How to improve the availability of
biological specimens? Countries are
sometimes reluctant to share biological
specimens, either because they might
jeopardise trade, or because they might
themselves have commercial value. 
Even if countries are willing to share
specimens, restrictions and regulations on
the transportation and availability of
biological specimens have been substantially
tightened following the 9/11 attacks. 
This reduces the potential for their misuse,
but it is important that such regulations do
not over-constrain the flow of biological
material, which is important for the
development and testing of DIM devices.
How to improve access and use of healthcare data? Sometimes, countries are
also reluctant to share information on disease outbreaks since this can affect
trade, tourism and have substantial knock-on effects on business. A key issue is
how to incentivise countries to release such information for the common good.
However, there is also a considerable amount of disease data that is already
collected, but which is poorly connected. An important issue is how to promote
better access to and linkages between this information so that the greatest good
is attained while protecting the rights and confidentiality of individuals.
Q12 What are the choices for standards and interoperability?
Interoperability, open access and the adoption of common standards
generally work to the benefit of the user/purchaser. However, they can
also benefit developers by promoting the sharing of data and
information, opening up markets and allowing small companies to
introduce niche products. An important question is what standards
would maximise the public good, and who should champion them?
Fig 4.2: The availability of biological 
specimens is vital for the development 
of new DIM devices
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Interoperability and open access: the adoption of open standards could help
small firms develop diagnostic tests for diseases that are not of commercial
interest to larger firms. This could help in promoting products and systems for
the diseases of the developing world. For example, for hand-held devices, it
would be advantageous if reagents from one manufacturer could be used with
the microfluidic devices from another, or if a test from one manufacturer could
function on the platform of another. Another example includes the desirability of
establishing common standards for data, such as genome datasets.
Regulating the quality of hand-held diagnostic devices: this will be vital. 
For example, false negatives could allow the early stages of an epidemic to go
unnoticed, with vital days being lost. In the case of FMD, a delay of 3–4 days could
result in the doubling of the size of the epidemic (see section on validation, below).
Validation: any diagnostic device or system should be validated to show that it 
is fit for its purpose. Challenges will include: the collection of appropriate 
samples for validation (this could be particularly difficult for new or rare diseases
occurring in remote regions); and the construction of sample banks linked to
good clinical data.
Q13 How can we best exploit exogenous developments?
Many opportunities for developing new DIM systems will arise by
taking advantage of exogenous developments – i.e. those largely
unrelated to the basic drivers of managing infectious diseases. 
The question is how best to exploit those to maximum advantage.
How can we maximise the public good
from personal data unconnected with
healthcare? A considerable amount of
information currently collected for purposes
not connected with healthcare could be of
substantial use in modelling and managing
infectious diseases. Such information might
relate to mobile phone location data or the
use of electronic travel cards on mass
transport systems. It is suggested that key
stakeholders and interested parties (such as
phone operators, academics and healthcare
stakeholders) be brought together to discuss
how to better realise the public good from
such data. Key issues already being
discussed in a number of fora include data access, the protection of privacy, and
personal control over the data. For health purposes, such dialogues could usefully
start at the national level and then be extended internationally.
Fig 4.3: Mobile phone location data is 
an example of personal information
unconnected with healthcare
4 Key choices for policy makers
31
How to maximise the opportunity created by the future cheap genome
sequencing technologies? Much of the development of these is driven by
commercial and health needs unrelated to infectious diseases. To take full
advantage will require significant advances in the basic science and investigation
of infectious diseases in areas such as pathology and bioinformatics. It will also
require a mix of public and private sector measures, reflecting the different sizes
of potential markets for diagnostics in different types of disease.
How to maximise the public good from the drive for increasingly
sophisticated hand-held devices, especially those that are networked?
Major developments here are being undertaken by mobile phone companies and
software providers to develop new classes of product for lifestyle and leisure users
and for tackling the chronic diseases of the developed world. Taking advantage of
these trends may depend on early agreement in areas such as interoperability,
technical standards, data protocols, and systems of regulation and governance.
There is a case to bring together mobile phone companies, diagnostic developers
and disease management stakeholders to consider these issues.
How to build off systems developed for tackling terrorism, drugs,
explosives and fire arms? In the future, these systems may offer the potential
to help in the detection and identification of diseases, particularly at high-
throughput transport nodes such as ports and airports. The issues are how to
adapt the technology for DIM, and how to build the information that might be
generated, into disease-management systems.
Q14 What are the key choices for Africa?
Africa is faced with the greatest burden of diseases and the lowest level
of resources to manage them. Decisions taken by African policy makers
today will crucially affect their ability to manage the future threat.
Should Africans take the lead in developing a new Vision and Strategy for
the management of infectious diseases? Africa is beset with infectious
diseases, old and new. African experts, who were involved in a project pan-
African workshop in Uganda, suggested that Africans could usefully take the lead
in developing a new Vision and Strategy for the management of diseases across
the continent. This would be surveillance based, and supported by regional
centres of excellence. The Vision and Strategy would cover diseases in humans,
animals and plants, recognising that these are interlinked in complex ways, and
that their detection is increasingly dependent on a common technical platform.
How best to build capacity? African experts observed that many donor organisations
commission studies on Africa, either directly or indirectly, but these are too often
conducted by experts outside Africa. This is demoralising for African experts and
also acts as a disincentive for experts to stay in the country. If donor organisations
were to decide to use more in-country experts, this could help to build capacity at
no cost and would ensure that local issues and conditions were better considered.
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‘Smart partnerships’ were widely
advocated both by African experts
within the project, and international
organisations as a means to build and
maintain capacity. These would involve
experts and organisations from African
and developed countries; they would
promote the sharing of information and
expertise and could also help to ensure
that new DIM systems were relevant
to the continent.
How to ensure that African
politicians have the best information
to justify the allocation of resources? Claims for resources to manage
infectious diseases must compete alongside many others. The African experts
considered that there was a need for better information to inform politicians of
the needs and benefits of supporting better disease management, including DIM.
How to ensure that infectious diseases are taken into account in the
development of other policies? In the case of regionalisation, for example,
removing trade restrictions on seed within the East Africa Community could make the
control of diseases more difficult and create the need for counterbalancing measures.
How to ensure that DIM systems are linked to effective follow-on
treatment? This is critical since, without effective treatment, expenditure on the
DIM systems would have limited value. There is no easy answer to this.
However, the problem underlines the need to embed the deployment of any
future DIM systems firmly within integrated strategies for disease control.
Q15 What are the implications for science?
Understanding the future risks of infectious diseases, and how best to
use DIM to help manage those risks is an interdisciplinary problem.
A key challenge is to bring together relevant skills expertise to deliver
properly integrated scientific research and development and to provide
suitable opportunities for capacity building.
Removing intellectual barriers: we need a science base that will deliver DIM
technologies and systems that are both generic and flexible. This means that
traditional divides – e.g. between virology, bacteriology, mycology and
parasitology, or between medicine, veterinary medicine and plant science – need
to be bridged. Similarly, the science base underlying DIM technologies needs to
advance alongside social science research concerning the effective deployment
of DIM systems.
Fig 4.4: Smart partnerships offer an 
opportunity to build and maintain capacity
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Key drivers are mostly not biological: future infectious disease risks will be
determined by a complex multitude of factors such as human demography and
behaviour, land use and agriculture, travel and trade, climate, social trends and
economics, governance systems, disease control policies, public attitudes, natural
disasters and (conceivably) bioterrorism. Analysing past, current and future trends
in each of these drivers is a formidable task in its own right.
A broad knowledge base is essential: we still have only a sketchy understanding
of the relationship between the key drivers and infectious disease burdens.
Further advances will require moving beyond the traditional confines of
epidemiological research to embrace a wide range of other disciplines such as
anthropology, economics and climatology.
Data on disease emergence: one route to a better understanding of future
disease risks is a better understanding of past and present examples of the
emergence and spread of infectious diseases. Collation and critical analysis of
such data could provide valuable information. Every new outbreak provides
valuable data for research, if appropriate efforts are made to capture it and to
make it available.
Improved modelling capacity: mathematical approaches are increasingly being
used to assess current and future disease risks as aids in the design of
intervention strategies and as a source of advice to policy makers. Further
development of statistical, computational and mathematical tools is required,
especially on the linkage between models and data. A better understanding of
these approaches within the wider community would help ensure that
mathematical models are used to best effect.
Q16 What are the implications for technology and systems?
How DIM technology is used is just as important as the technology
itself, and considerable benefits are foreseen from improving the
systems in which the technology operates.
Better technologies: some relatively new technologies need further
development. For example, technologies to distinguish vaccinated individuals and
animals from those exposed to infection need to be developed for real-time
application in the field. Better diagnostic testing for pre-clinical and sub-clinical
infections would greatly assist the management of epidemics.
New technologies: research and development is still mainly directed at
diagnosing specific infections in individuals. It would be useful to develop tools
for testing for a number of different infectious agents at the same time and tools
for screening large numbers of individuals based on non-specific responses to
infection. There may be synergies between different approaches to diagnostics –
e.g. between genomic and immunology-based technologies – which could be
exploited in a single device.
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Technology integration: advances in individual technologies – such as data
capture, genomics-based diagnostics, smart swabs or high-throughput screening
– are of limited value in isolation. The integration of technologies, such as
combining hand-held diagnostic devices with wireless internet links, could deliver
much more powerful tools.
Design of surveillance systems: the science of designing disease surveillance
systems to detect unusual disease events or to identify at-risk populations is
relatively underdeveloped. Modern computational and modelling approaches
could be used to address this issue.
Health systems research: we need to understand how new DIM technologies
can be used most effectively, and how to promote their use as part of systems
for managing human, animal or plant diseases. This would include more detailed
study of the needs, expectations, capabilities and sensitivities of the end users
and other stakeholders.
Q17 What are the implications for skills?
The tasks of identifying future disease risks and developing and
deploying DIM technologies to help manage those risks are inherently
interdisciplinary. We need individuals with specialist skills and,
importantly, with combinations of different skills if we are to meet 
the challenge.
Skill sets: traditional training in science and technology does not deliver the
range of skills necessary to tackle the breadth of issues relevant to assessing and
managing infectious disease risks. Interdisciplinary approaches to training, more
opportunities for scientists and technologists to broaden their skill set at any
stage of their careers, and international exchanges of knowledge and expertise
would all help to address this problem.
Maintaining expertise: the erosion of expertise in key disciplines threatens our
ability to maintain infrastructural competence and surveillance – all the more so in
developing countries. New technologies, ‘smart partnerships’, centres of
excellence and international fellowships for collaborative study could provide
much-needed integration and sustainability.
Communication skills: a key aspect of interdisciplinary working is good
communication. This applies at every level: scientists with scientists in 
different disciplines (including social sciences and the humanities); scientists 
with technologists; scientists with policy makers and other stakeholders. 
Greater emphasis on communication skills at every career stage, including 
direct experience of communicating across disciplines, would facilitate more
effective interactions.
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Q18 What are the implications for public engagement?
The public will need to weigh the ‘costs’ of some future DIM systems
(e.g. concerning civil liberties) against the benefits the systems will
bring (e.g. reduced risk from disease). Public engagement with these
issues will be a precondition for ensuring the effective design of 
such systems.
For example:
• Where DIM systems use personal data, the public will need to be convinced
that its collection and use in monitoring systems is necessary, and that desired
confidentiality will be maintained. For example, the use of trusted bodies could
usefully be considered as a gateway for particularly sensitive data (to ensure
personal information is not passed on).
• Hand-held diagnostic devices (UC3) offer considerable scope for inappropriate
use. As they become more widely available, nationally and internationally, it
will be essential to engage with potential users to develop systems that
support the use of devices and reagents only from reputable sources. It will
also be important to ensure that users are supported with professional advice
to enable them to use the devices safely and to take the appropriate actions in
response to the diagnoses they obtain.
• High-throughput screening, for example at ports and airports, presents
particular sensitivities. Any future systems would need to take careful account
of the needs and concerns of the wide range of travellers and operators that
might be affected.
Q19 What are the next steps?
A report of this breadth cannot provide detailed answers to the
complex problems of managing the vast multitude of diseases in
countries across the world. It has not set out to do that, but rather to
provide signposts to how the threat may evolve and where policy
development could usefully be considered.
Nor does the project seek to tell stakeholders what they should or
must do. Rather, its findings are provided for policy makers and
stakeholders to consider and to interpret within the context of their
own situation and their own policy development processes.
A number of important stakeholders have already announced actions that will be
taken following the launch of the findings. These may be found in the Action Plan
(project report P1). The OSI welcomes these developments and others that are
being considered elsewhere.

Appendix A
37
Appendix A
Experts involved in the work
The Office of Science and Innovation would like to acknowledge and thank the
members of the project’s Science Co-ordination Group, the leaders of the Risk
Evaluation work, the High-level Stakeholder Group, the Expert Advisory Group
and the many other individuals listed below who contributed to the work. 
Science Co-ordination Group  
Professor Catherine Professor of Paediatric Institute of Child Health, 
Peckham – Chair Epidemiology University College London
Professor Joe Brownlie Professor of Veterinary Pathology Royal Veterinary College
and Director of ECTP
Professor Jeff Waage Director, Centre for Environmental Imperial College London
Policy
Professor Mark Woolhouse Chair of Infectious Disease Centre for Infectious Diseases,
Epidemiology University of Edinburgh
Risk evaluation leaders    
Professor Joyce Tait Director Economic and Social Research
Council, Innogen Centre
Laura Meagher, PhD Senior Partner Technology Development Group/
Innogen
High-level Stakeholder Group – members, associate members and deputies  
Lord (Willy) Bach of Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Sustainable Farming and Food) and
Lutterworth – Chair sponsoring Minister for project
Sir David King Chief Scientific Adviser to UK Government and Head of the Office of
Science and Innovation
Professor Roy Anderson Chief Scientific Adviser, Ministry of Defence
Dr Anarfi Asamoa-Baah Assistant Director-General, HIV/AIDS, TB & Malaria (formerly, ADG,
Communicable Diseases), World Health Organization
Dr Richard Barker Director General, Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry 
Professor Peter Borriello Centre Director, Health Protection Agency 
Dr Diego Buriot Special Adviser to Assistant Director General, Communicable Diseases,
World Health Organization
Dr Margaret Chan Assistant Director-General, Communicable Diseases, World Health
Organization
Professor Howard Dalton Chief Scientific Adviser, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
Dr Joseph Domenech Chief of Animal Health Service, Food and Agriculture Organization 
Sir Liam Donaldson Chief Medical Officer, Department of Health 
Professor Steven Edwards Chief Executive, Veterinary Laboratories Agency - representing the World
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) 
Professor Julia Goodfellow Chief Executive, Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council
CBE – representing Research Councils UK
Infectious Diseases: preparing for the future
38
High-level Stakeholder Group – members, associate members and deputies (continued)
Dr Rick Hall Technical Director, Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Porton Down
Dr David Harper Chief Scientist and Director of Health Protection, International Health and
Scientific Development, Department of Health
Dr Stephen Hunter Head of Plant Health, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
Dr Richard Klausner formerly, Executive Director of Global Health programme, Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation
Mr Andy Lebrecht Director General, Food, Farming and Fisheries, Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs
Mr Mark Neale Managing Director, Budget, Tax and Welfare Directorate, HM Treasury
(formerly, DG, Security, International and Organised Crime, Home Office)
Dr David Nowell International Plant Protection Convention Secretariat, AGPP-Food and
Agriculture Organization
Dr Debby Reynolds Chief Veterinary Officer, Director General Animal Health and Welfare,
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
Dr Richard Scott OBE Director of Science, Defence Science and Technology Laboratory 
Ms Angela Singh Head of Science and Technology Unit, Home Office
Dr Jan Slingenburgh Senior Officer, Animal Health Service, Food and Agriculture Organization
Ms Helen Thorne Head of the Research Councils UK Secretariat
Professor Pat Troop Chief Executive, Health Protection Agency
Dr Stewart Tyson Head of Health Profession, Department for International Development
Dr Niek Van der Graaf Chief of Plant Protection Service, Food and Agriculture Organization
Mr Martin Ward Plant Health Division, Department for Food and Rural Affairs
Sir Robert Watson Chief Scientist and Director for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable
Development, The World Bank
Lord Larry Whitty formerly, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Farming, Food and 
(former chair) Sustainable Energy
Expert Advisory Group – members and deputies 
Mr Derek Flynn – Chair Project Leader, Detection and Identification of Infectious Diseases,
Foresight, Office of Science and Innovation
Dr Ian Barker Head of Immunological and Molecular Methods, Central Science Laboratory
Professor Tony Barnett ESRC Professional Research Fellow, DESTIN, London School of Economics
Professor Cristopher Bartlett Visiting Professor of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Centre for Infectious
Disease Epidemiology, University College London and London School of
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
Dr Andy Bell Chief Scientist CBRN, Home Office 
Dr Edward Coyle Director, British Medical Association, Board of Science
Dr Claire Craig Director, Foresight, Office of Science and Innovation
Dr Peter Dukes Board Programme Manager - Infections and Immunity Board, Medical
Research Council 
Dr Simon Earwicker Group Leader, Defence Science and Technology Laboratory
Dr Stephen Hunter Head of Plant Health, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
Professor Anne Johnson Department of Primary Care and Population Science, University College
London
Professor Jonathan Jones Head, The Sainsbury Laboratory 
Mr Fred Landeg Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer, Department for Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs
Dr Ian Lawston Chief Scientist, Detection Department, Defence Science and Technology
Laboratory
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Expert Advisory Group – members and deputies (continued)
Professor John Lucas Head of Plant Pathogen Interactions Division, Rothamsted Research
Dr David Mackay Head of Pirbright Laboratory, Institute for Animal Health
Dr Dilys Morgan Head of the Emerging Infections and Zoonoses, Health Protection Agency
Professor Angus Nicoll Seconded National Expert, European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control and Health Protection Agency UK
Dr Martin Pearce Scientific Leader, Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Porton Down
Dr Scott Sellers Scientific Officer, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
Professor Peter Smith CBE Professor of Tropical Epidemiology, London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine 
Dr John Stephenson Chief Research Officer, Department of Health 
Dr Peter Stevenson Head of Research and Development in Veterinary Exotic Diseases,
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
Dr Angela Williams Programme Manager – Infections and Immunity Board Medical Research
Council
Dr Penny Wilson Consultant to the Life Science, Biotechnology and Healthcare Industries
Dr Marion Wooldridge Head, Centre for Epidemiology and Risk Analysis, Veterinary Laboratories
Agency
Contributors to the project
Ms Nana Abadji Project Manager Foresight Directorate, Office of
Science and Innovation
Dr Matthew Addis IT Innovation Centre University of Southampton 
Dr Richard Adegobola Director Medical Research Council
Laboratories, Gambia 
Dr William Amanfu Animal Health Officer Food and Agriculture Organization 
Professor Alan L Archibald Head of Division of Genomics Roslin Institute
and Bioinformatics
Dr Catherine Arnold Applied and Functional Health Protection Agency
Genomics Unit
Dr Richard Ashcroft Reader in Biomedical Ethics Imperial College London
Dr Richard Baines Department of Agriculture Royal Agricultural College
Dr Richard Baker Principal Scientific Officer Central Science Laboratory
Professor Christopher Visiting Professor of Infectious Centre for Infectious Disease
Bartlett Disease Epidemiology Epidemiology, University College
London and London School of
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
Ms Alice Baxter Manager, International Plant Department of Agriculture, 
Health Matters Republic of South Africa
Professor Matthew Baylis Chair in TSE Epidemiology University of Liverpool
Professor Norman Begg Medical Director Glaxo Smithkline
Dr Eshetu Bekele Senior Researcher, Plant Pathology Ethiopian Agriculture Research 
Organisation, Ethiopia
Dr Louise Bennett Director Vivas Limited
Professor Malcolm Bennett Head of Department of Veterinary University of Liverpool
Pathology
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Contributors to the project (continued)
Dr Graham Bent Data Sciences IBM UK Laboratories
Mr Robert Bernard Project Co-ordinator Foresight Directorate, Office of
Science and Innovation
Mr Richard Berridge EU Policy adviser Department for Environment, Food
and Rural Affairs
Professor Virginia Berridge Centre for History in Public Health London School of Hygiene and
Tropical Medicine
Mr Paul Bessell Epidemiology Group University of Edinburgh
Dr Martin Bidartondo Lecturer Imperial College London and
Kew Gardens 
Dr Dave Birch Director Consult Hyperion
Dr Michael Birkett Senior Research Scientist Rothamsted Research 
Mr Sam J Bishop Plant Health Group Central Science Laboratory
Professor Stephen Bishop Division of Genetics and Genomics Roslin Institute
Dr Mpoko Bokanga Executive Director African Agricultural Technology
Foundation, Kenya
Professor David Bradley Ross Professor of Tropical London School of Hygiene and
Hygiene Emeri Tropical Medicine 
Dr Robert F Breiman International Emerging Centers for Disease Control and
Infections Programme Prevention, Kenya
Mr Komayombi Bulegeya Commissioner, Crop Protection Ministry of Agriculture, Animal
Industry and Fisheries, Uganda
Dr Deborah Burgess Senior Programme Officer Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,
USA 
Dr David Brown Director, Virus Reference Health Protection Agency
Department
Mr Tony Bryant Senior Manager, Project Scanner HM Revenue and Customs
Team
Dr Phil Butcher Professor of Molecular Medical St George’s Hospital, London
Microbiology
Dr Lee Calvert Plant Virologist Centro Internacional de Agricultura
Tropical, Colombia
Dr Diarmid Campbell- Scientist World Health Organization
Lendrum
Dr Annette Carey Technical Manager Horticultural Development Council
Ms Siobhan Carey Chief Statistician Department for International
Development
Dr Rachel Carson General Manager Inscentinel Ltd.
Professor Tony Cass Deputy Director Institute of Biomedical Engineering,
Imperial College London
Dr Tim Chancellor Group Leader: Plant, Animal & Natural Resources Institute,
Human Health Group University of Greenwich
Professor Chifumbe Chintu Professor of Paediatrics and University of Zambia
Child Health
Dr Freddy Choi IT Innovation Centre University of Southampton
Appendix A
41
Contributors to the project (continued)
Dr Mariann Chriel Epidemiologist Danish Institute for Food and
Veterinary Research
Dr Richard Coker Reader London School of Hygiene and
Tropical Medicine
Professor John Collinge Director MRC Prion Unit and University College London
Head of Department
Dr David C Cook School of Resources, Environment Australian National University
and Society
Professor Jon Cooper Department of Electronics and Glasgow University
Electrical Engineering
Professor Hoosen Coovadia Doris Duke Medical Research University of KwaZulu-Natal
Institute 
Dr Andrew Cottam Head, Biological Agents Unit Health and Safety Executive
Dr Denis Coulombier Head, Preparedness and European Centre for Disease 
Response Unit Prevention and Control
Dr Nick Coulson Head International Animal Department for Environment, 
Health Division Food and Rural Affairs
Dr Chris Danks Plant Health Group Central Science Laboratory
Dr Glyn Davies Consultant UK
Ms Ann Davison Consultant to Defra on Consumer Department for Environment, 
Engagement project Food and Rural Affairs
Professor Bill Day Director Silsoe Research Institute
Dr Kevin DeCock Director Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Kenya 
Professor Dave de Roure Professor of Computer Science University of Southampton
Dr Chris Desmond Development Studies Institute London School of Economics
(DESTIN)
Dr Adama Diallo Head of the Animal Production International Atomic Energy Agency,
and Health Unit Austria
Dr Diadier Diallo Epidemiology and Data Centre National de Recherche et de
Management Unit Formation sur le Paludisme
Professor Adrian Dixon Clinical Director of Radiology Addenbrooke’s Hospital, Cambridge
Professor Christl Donnelly Professor of Statistical Epidemiology Imperial College London
Dr Nigel Dowdall Director Health Services British Airways
Dr Alan Doyle Science Programme Manager Wellcome Trust
Dr Mel Duffield Team Leader, Protein Biochemistry, Defence Science and Technology 
Biomedical Sciences Laboratory
Dr Christopher Dye Tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and Malaria World Health Organization
Dr Simon Eden-Green Consultant EG Consulting
Dr John Edmunds Head, Modelling and Economics Unit Health Protection Agency 
Dr Mike English Senior Research Fellow KEMRI/Wellcome Trust Collaborative
Programme, Kenya
Dr Denis Fargette Plant Virologist International Relief and
Development, France
Professor Neil Ferguson Department of Infectious Diseases Imperial College London
and Epidemiology
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Dr Eric Fevre Centre for Infectious Diseases University of Edinburgh
Professor Paul Fine Professor of Epidemiology London School of Hygiene and
Tropical Medicine
Dr Bart Fraajie Plant Pathogen Interactions Division Rothamsted Research
Professor Rob W Fraser Centre for Environmental Policy Imperial College London
Mr Christopher Furk Principal Plant Health and Seeds Department for Environment, 
Inspector Food and Rural Affairs
Dr Linda Galloway formerly, TPU, Home Office 
Dr Berhe Gebreegziabher Director National Veterinary Institute of
Ethiopia 
Dr Paul Wenzel Geissler Senior Lecturer in Social London School of Hygiene and 
Anthropology Tropical Medicine
Professor C G Gemmell Director of Scottish MRSA University of Glasgow 
Reference Laboratory and
Professor of Bacterial Infection
and Epidemiology 
Dr Elizabeth S George Deputy Portfolio Director Department of Homeland Security,
Biological Countermeasures US
Portfolio
Professor George Gettinby Co-Director, Veterinary Informatics University of Strathclyde
and Epidemiology
Professor John Gibson The Institute for Genetics and University of New England, Australia
Bioinformatics 
Dr Jeffrey Gilbert Western Pacific Region World Health Organization 
Professor Noel Gill Consultant Epidemiologist Health Protection Agency 
Professor Stephen Gillespie Regional Microbiologist Royal Free and University College
Hospital School
Professor Christopher Professor of Mathematical Biology
A Gilligan University of Cambridge 
Dr Andrew Githeko Chief Research Officer and Head: Kenya Medical Research Institute,
Climate Human and Health Kisumu, Kenya 
Research Unit 
Professor Ernest Gould Senior Research Fellow Centre for Ecology and Hydrology
Dr Simon Gowen Principal Research Fellow Department of Agriculture,
University of Reading
Professor Rod Griffiths President Faculty of Public Health 
Dr Peter Grimley Head of Import Policy, International Department for Environment, 
Animal Health Division Food and Rural Affairs
Professor Robert Gurney Director, Environmental Systems University of Reading 
Science Centre
Dr Hans Hagen Senior Manager Wellcome Trust
Dr Rosie Hails Head of the Pathogen Population Centre for Ecology and Hydrology
Ecology Research Team
Professor Jim Hall Professor of Earth Systems University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne
Engineering
Dr Nigel Hardwick Fellow Central Science Laboratory
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Mr Steven Hart Security Development Manager British Airports Authority
Dr Jeremy Hawker Deputy Director, Local and Health Protection Agency
Regional Services Division
Dr Simon Hay Department of Zoology University of Oxford 
Mr Gerard Hetherington Division Head – Health Protection Department of Health
Professor Stephen Hill Head of Plant Health Group Central Science Laboratory
Dr Judith Hilton Head, Microbiological Safety Division Food Standards Agency
Dr Abraham Hodgson Director, Navrongo Health Research Ministry of Health, Ghana
Centre
Ms Elizabeth Hoile Project Officer for China and Health Protection Agency Centre
Hong Kong activities for Infections 
Mr Tony Howard Deputy Director, Intellectual Patent Office
Property and Innovation Directorate
Professor Jianshi Huang Professor of Epidemiology and Chinese Academy of Medical
Assistant President Sciences and Peking Union Medical
College, Beijing China
Professor Mike Hulme Director Tyndall Centre for Climate Change
Dr Geoff Jenkins Hadley Centre Met Office
Mr Craig Johnson Group Support Corporate Planning Team, Office of
Science and Innovation
Dr David J Jones Plant Health Group Central Science Laboratory
Dr Jane Jones Consultant Epidemiologist, Health Protection Agency
Head of Travel and Migrant
Health Section 
Dr Peter Jones Project Coordinator Centro Internacional de Agricultura
Tropical, Colombia
Dr Phil Jones Plant Pathogen Interaction Division Rothamsted Research 
Professor Dominic M Dean, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine Sokoine University of Agriculture,
Kambarage Tanzania
Professor Salim Abdool Deputy Vice-Chair Chancellor University of KwaZulu-Natal
Karim 
Dr Matthew J Keeling Department of Biological Sciences University of Warwick
Mr Peter Kenmore Global Integrated Pest Management Food and Agriculture Organization
Facility, AGPP
Dr Lawrence Kenyon Plant pathologist/virologist Natural Resources Institute,
University of Greenwich
Ilona Kickbusch, PhD Kickbusch Health Consult,
Switzerland
Dr Francis Kimmins Crop Protection Programme NR International 
Manager 
Dr Alex King Policy Adviser ERDU, Department of Trade and
Industry
Dr Donald King Senior Research Scientist, Institute for Animal Health 
Mr Sari Kovats Lecturer – Epidemiology London School of Hygiene and
Tropical Medicine
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Dr Patti Kristjanson Operating Project Leader International Livestock Research
Institute, Nairobi, Kenya
Mr Russ Kruska Scientist International Livestock Research
Institute, Nairobi, Kenya
Dr Jerome Kubiriba Banana Programme National Agricultural Research
Organisation, Uganda
Professor Mark Laing Director African Centre for Crop Improvement,
Pretoria, South Africa
Ms Mary Lawrence Project Manager Foresight Directorate, Office of
Science and Innovation
Professor Steve Leach Scientific Leader Health Protection Agency
Dr Berga Lemaga Co-ordinator Association for Strengthening
Agricultural Research in Eastern and
Central Africa, Entebbe, Uganda
Professor Jillian Lenne Independent Consultant
Mr Joseph Litamoi Pan-African Veterinary Vaccine African Union
Centre
Professor Steven Lindsay Institute of Ecosystem Science, University of Durham
School of Biological
and Biomedical Sciences
Dr Stephen Little Chief Executive Officer DxS Ltd.
Dr Gordon Logan Managing Director Labformatics Ltd.
Dr Oumou Sangare Loko Laboratoire Central Veterinaire, Mali
Dr Catherine Lyall Research Fellow Economic and Social Research
Council, Innogen Centre 
Dr John Lynam Managing Director Kilimo Trust/Gatsby Charitable
Foundation, Kampala, Uganda
Professor David W Director Wildlife Conservation Oxford University
Macdonald Research Unit, Department of 
Zoology
Professor Brian Mahy Senior Scientist Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Atlanta, USA
Professor Martin Maiden Department of Zoology Oxford University
Dr Christopher Marooney Centre for Epidemiology and Veterinary Laboratories Association
Risk Analysis
Professor Kevin Marsh Centre for Geographic Medicine Kenya Medical Research Institute/
Wellcome Trust Collaborative
Programme
Dr Greg Masters LEC-CABI Alliance Leader Lancaster Environment Centre
Dr Monica Musenero Epidemiologist Ministry of Health, Uganda
Masanza  
Dr Franziska Matthies Visiting Fellow University of Tyndall Centre for Climate Change
East Anglia 
Dr Keith McAdam Director Infectious Diseases Institute,
Makerere University, Uganda
Benjamin J J McCormick TALA Research Group, Department Oxford University
of Zoology
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Professor John McDermott Deputy Director General International Livestock Research
Institute, Nairobi, Kenya
Dr John McGiven Veterinary Laboratories Agency
Dr Martin McPherson Director – Plant Pathology Stockbridge Technology Centre
Dr Danius Michaelides School of Electronics and University of Southampton
Computer Science
Professor Uswege Minga Professor and Registrar The Open University of Tanzania 
Professor Jennifer Mordue Department of Zoology University of Aberdeen
Dr Geraint Morgan Planetary and Space Sciences The Open University, UK
Research Institute
Professor Ivan Morrison Head of Research Royal (Dick) School of Veterinary
Studies, University of Edinburgh 
Dr Bonaventure Mtei Senior Livestock Officer Southern African Development
Community, Botswana
Dr Uwe Mueller-Doblies Head of Biosecurity Institute of Animal Health
Professor John D Mumford Centre for Environmental Policy Imperial College London
Dr Jotham Musiime Consultant formerly, Director AU-IBAR, Kenya
Professor Anthony Musoke Research and Technology Manager Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute,
South Africa 
Dr Charles Mwansambo Director Lilongwe Central Hospital, Malawi 
Professor Marie-Louise Centre for Paediatric Epidemiology Institute of Child Health, 
Newell and Biostatistics University College London
Dr Rose Njeru University of Nairobi, Kenya 
Dr Baleguel Nknot Managing Director Yaounde Initiative Foundation,
Cameroon 
Dr Stephen Nutsugah Senior Research Scientist/Head, Savanna Agricultural Research
Plant Pathology Section Institute, Ghana
Professor Timothy U Obi Professor, Veterinary Medicine Ibadan University, Nigeria
and Public Health
Professor Kwame Offei Dean, Department of Crop Science University of Ghana
Dr Anne O’Garra Head of Division of National Institute of Medical Research
Immunoregulation
Dr James Ogwang Ag. Director of Research Coffee Research Institute, Kituza,
Uganda 
Dr Joseph Okello-Onen Senior Research Officer Livestock Health Research Institute,
Uganda 
Dr William Olah-Mukani Director of Animal Resources Ministry of Agriculture, Uganda 
Dr Ahono Olembo Assistant Director AU Inter-African Phytosanitary
Council, Yaunde, Cameroun
Dr Kenneth Ombongi Department of History University of Nairobi, Kenya
Dr Alex Opio Assistant Commissioner Ministry of Health, Kampala, Uganda
Dr Fina Opio Director of Research Namulonge Agricultural and Animal
Production Research Institute
Dr William Otim-Nape Consultant and Former Acting National Agricultural Research
Director General Organisation, Uganda 
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Dr Erasmus Otolok-Tanga Consultant Institute of Public Health, Uganda 
Professor John Oxford Retroscreen Virology Ltd. Bart’s and the London
Queen Mary’s School of Medicine
and Dentistry
Professor Stephen Palmer Department of Epidemiology, Cardiff University
Statistics and Public Health
Mr Jon Parke Project Manager Foresight Directorate, Office of
Science and Innovation
Professor Julian Parkhill Head of Pathogen Sequencing Unit The Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute
Dr Roger Paskin Vet Manager Trade, Meat Board of Namibia
Dr Ed Peeler Veterinary Epidemiologist Centre for Environment, Fisheries
and Aqua Culture Science
Dr Rosanna Peeling Manager, Diagnostic Research World Health Organization
and Development 
Dr Ferdinand Peer Senior Manager Application Vodafone
Field Mobile Health
Professor Hugh Pennington Institute of Medical Sciences University of Aberdeen
Professor Jan Pentreath formerly, Chief Scientist and Environment Agency
Director Environmental Strategy
Dr Elaine Perkins Deputy Team Leader, Biosensors Defence Science and Technology
Laboratory
Professor Dirk Pfeiffer Professor of Veterinary Epidemiology Royal Veterinary College
Dr Noah Phiri Plant Pathologist CABI African Regional Centre, Kenya
Professor John Pickett Head, Biological Chemistry Division Rothamsted Research 
Dr Yvonne Pinto Head of Agriculture The Gatsby Charitable Foundation
Mr Neil Pitter formerly, Project Administrator,
Foresight Directorate, Office of 
Science and Innovation
Mr Andy Price Security Technical and Process British Airports Authority
Manager
Dr Bethan V Purse TALA Research Group, Department Oxford University
of Zoology
Ms M Megan Quinlan Regulatory Specialist Interconnect Consulting 
Mr Dennis Rangi Director CABI Africa Regional Centre, Kenya 
Dr Robin Reid Ecologist International Livestock Research
Institute, Nairobi, Kenya
Dr Alistair Robb Health Adviser Department for International
Development, Kampala, Uganda
Dr Tim Robinson Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative Food and Agriculture Organization
Professor Tom Rodden Professor of Computer Science University of Nottingham
Dr Guenal Rodier Director, Department of World Health Organization
Communicable Disease Surveillance
and Response
Dr Peter Roeder Animal Health Service, Animal Food and Agriculture Organization
Production and Health Division
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Professor David J. Rogers TALA Research Group, Department Oxford University
of Zoology
Ms Pamela Rogers Team Leader - Prohibitions and HM Revenue and Customs
Restrictions
Dr Cathy Roth Team Co-ordinator World Health Organization
Ms Ros Rouse Associate Director Economic and Social Research
Council
Mr Owen Rowland Head of Counter Terrorism and Home Office
Science and Technology Policy
Dr Gabriel Rugalema Policy Advisor The International Institute for
Educational Planning/UNESCO,
France 
Dr Francis Runumi Commissioner for Planning – Ministry of Health, Uganda 
Health Services 
Dr Amal Rushdy Consultant Epidemiologist Health Protection Agency 
Dr Mark Rweyemamu Consultant Tanzania
Dr David Salisbury Head of Immunisation Department of Health
Dr Roland Salmon Director, Communicable Disease National Public Health Service for
Surveillance Centre Wales 
Dr Victoria Sanderson TALA Research Group, Department Oxford University
of Zoology
Dr Sidibe Amadou Samba Regional Representative World Organisation for Animal Health
(OIE), Bamako, Mali 
Dr Dhan Samuel Head of Serology Development Unit, Centre for Infections,
Virus Reference Department Health Protection Agency
Dr Abraham Sangula FMD Laboratory, Embakasi Nairobi, Kenya
Dr Osman Sankoh Communication and External Indepth Network, Ghana
Relations Manager 
Dr Gordon Sanghera Chief Executive Officer Oxford NanoLabs Ltd.
Dr Sidi Sanyang Consultant in the Executive Forum for Agricultural Research
Secretary’s Office in Africa, Accra, Ghana
Dr Matt Sapiano Earth Systems Science University of Maryland, US 
Interdisciplinary Center
Dr Claire Sansford Principal Risk Analyst Central Science Laboratory
Ms Barbara Saunders Consumer Consultant Foodaware
Dr Harald Schmidt Assistant Director Nuffield Centre for Bioethics
Dr Bouback Seck Vaccine Specialist Pan-African Veterinary Vaccine Centre,
Ethiopia 
Dr David Serwadda Consultant Makerere University Institute of
Public Health, Uganda 
Professor Nelson Dean, Faculty of Medicine Makerere University Medical College,
Sewankambo Uganda 
Ms Anjum Shah Project Administrator Foresight Directorate, Office of
Science and Innovation
Dr Mike Shaw Faculty of Life Sciences University of Reading
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Dr Alan Sher Head, Immunobiology Section, National Institute of Allergy and 
Laboratory of Parasitic Diseases Infectious Diseases, US
Dr Yang Shibiao National Exotic Animal Disease
Diagnostic Laboratory, Yunnan, China
Dr Dewan Sibartie Deputy Head, Scientific and World Organisation for Animal Health
Technical Department (OIE), Paris 
Dr Nigel Silman Group Leader Health Protection Agency 
Dr Peter Sinyangwe Director Veterinary Services, Ministry of
Agriculture and Co-operatives, Zambia
Sir John Skehel Vice President Academy of Medial Sciences
Dr Alan Smith Specialist Registrar in Public Health Protection Agency
Health Medicine
Professor David G E Smith Head of Functional Genomics and Moredun Research Institute
Proteomics 
Professor Geoffrey Smith Head of Department of Virology Imperial College London
Dr Julian J Smith Plant Health Group Central Science Laboratory
Professor Bob Snow Centre for Geographic Medicine Kenya Medical Research Institute/
Wellcome Trust Collaborative
Programme
Dr R Soi Deputy Biotechnology Co-ordinator Kenya Agricultural Research Centre,
Nairobi, Kenya 
Dr Nicola Spence Head of Plant Health Group Central Science Laboratory
Professor Brian G Spratt Department of Infectious Imperial College London
Disease Epidemiology
Dr Robert Sullivan Research and Technology Department for Transport
Strategy Division
Professor Will Stewart Independent Consultant
Mr Simon Strickland Civil Contingency Secretariat Cabinet Office
Dr James Stuart Regional Director Health Protection Agency 
Mr Jonathan Suk Research Fellow Economic and Social Research
Council, Innogen Centre 
Dr Dave Squirrell Detection Department Defence Science and Technology
Laboratory Porton Down
Ernest T Takafuji, M.D. Director, Office of Biodefense National Institute of Allergies and
Research Infectious Diseases, US
Dr Andrew J Tatem TALA Research Group, Department Oxford University
of Zoology
Dr Evans Taracha Operating Project Leader International Livestock Research
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Dr Steve Taylor IT Innovation Centre University of Southampton
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Health Management 
Appendix A
51
Contributors to the China consultation exercise (continued)
Director – Health Department of Disease Prevention and Control, Ministry of Health
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Associate Professor Department of Biochemistry, Peking Union Medical College 
Associate Professor Beijing Capital Medical University 
Professor Research Institute, China Agricultural Academy
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Vice-President Beijing Dianji Technology Ltd
Visiting Professor School of Management Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications
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Appendix B
Details of the work performed in the project
The main parts of the project are set out in Figure B1 and are described below.
The reader wishing to find out more about each of these aspects should begin
with the project reports indicated in brackets. A chart of all project reports and
supporting papers is provided in Appendix C.
Analysis of future threats (T1): a starting point was to generate a vision for the
future threats of infectious diseases and the factors driving them. This defines
the challenge facing stakeholders, and the requirements for future DIM systems.
T1 provides an overview of the findings which drew on: expert surveys in UK,
Africa and China; reviews of existing and new diseases; analysis of the future
effect of climate change on diseases; and the effect of diseases on ecosystems.
Analysis of societal contexts (D4): the effectiveness of future DIM systems will
crucially depend on their sensitive deployment within different systems of culture
and governance, as well as local systems of belief and attitudes. These issues
have been explored in several studies.
Fig B1: The key parts of the project
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Reviews of future science (S1): reviews of the state of the art were performed
in ten diverse areas of science. These will form the building blocks for new and
innovative DIM systems of the future. They ranged from Earth observation to
genomics, and data processing to immunological techniques.
Evaluation of future DIM systems (D1): four classes of future DIM systems
(User Challenges) were identified for detailed analysis (see Figure A1). The analysis
of these considered their costs and benefits against examples of future disease
threats. Roadmaps for their realisation were also produced, taking account of
barriers and enablers, as well as the societal contexts.
Action plan (P1): all of the above work has led to the development of a detailed
action plan by key stakeholders around the world.
Finally, because Africa was a key geographical focus for the project, all the Africa-
related strands of the project are drawn together in report A1, Africa.
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Risk analysis:
T2: Risk analysis
T3: Expert survey of the
UK and Africa
Disease case studies:
T5.1: MRSA
T5.2: HIV/AIDS
T5.3: Influenza in humans 
T5.5: Food-borne pathogens
T5.6: Fish diseases
T5.7: Potato late blight
T5.8: Malaria
T5.9: Rinderpest
T5.10: Plant viruses in 
sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA)   
T5.11: Sudden oak death
T5.12: West Nile virus
Climate change:
T7.1: Overview
T7.2: Plant diseases
T7.3: Animal diseases
T7.4: Human diseases
Modelling reviews:
T8.1 Overview
T8.2: Malaria in SSA 
T8.3: Bluetongue in Europe
T8.4: TB control in SSA
T8.5: Global traffic
T8.6: Foot-and-mouth 
disease (FMD)
T8.7: Paediatric HIV/AIDS
T8.8: Tsetse in SSA
T8.10: Malaria UK
T8.11: Eco-costs of potato 
ring rot
Detailed reviews of science:
S3: Intelligent sensor networks 
S4: Data mining and data fusion
S5: Non-invasive screening and scanning
S6: Genomics and bioinformatics
S7: Biosensors and biomarkers
S8: Interrogation of natural signals
S9: Predictive and real-time epidemiology
S10: Earth observation
S11: Host genetics and engineering
S12: Immunological techniques
S1: Science Review Summaries
Structure of the project reports and 
supporting papers
T1: Future Threats
E1: Executive Summary
NOTE: Report numbers are not sequential. 
Some report numbers were originally reserved for reports which were subsequently not commissioned.
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Further reviews 
and research:
T9: Review of initiatives
T10: Travel and migration 
and their impacts 
on diseases
T11: Effects of diseases 
on ecosystems 
T12: Wildlife trade
T13: China – human and
zoonotic diseases
T15: Plant pathogen 
database analysis
T16: Human pathogen 
database analysis
Africa papers:
A3.1 Paper for the
Commission 
for Africa (CfA)
A3.2 CfA paper 
appendices
A4: Report of a 
pan-African 
workshop
A5: Report of a 
pan-African 
workshop 
(French)
User Challenge work:
D2: Introduction to the 
User Challenge work
D2.1: UC1 – Data mining and data fusion
D2.2: UC2 – Genomics and post-genomics
for characterising new pathogens
D2.3: UC3 – Hand-held diagnostic devices
D2.4: UC4 – Fast-throughput screening
devices
Future control of diseases:
D3.1: Plant diseases
D3.2: Animal diseases
D3.3: Human diseases
Culture and governance:
D4.1: Plants
D4.2: Animals
D4.3: Humans
D5: Historical perspectives
D7: Public perceptions of risk
A1: Africa P1: Action PlanD1: Vision of Future
Detection, Identification 
and Monitoring Systems
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About Foresight
This project is one of a number of projects within the Office of Science and
Innovation’s Foresight programme. The aim of Foresight is to produce challenging
visions of the future in order to ensure effective strategies now. 
Six Foresight projects have now been completed, and details of each may be
found on www.foresight.gov.uk. Examples include:
• Cognitive Systems: looked at developments in the physical and life sciences
concerning thinking systems. The objective was to bring the two communities
together to share their knowledge and perspectives. The project explored
emerging and future technologies, for a wide range of applications in fields
such as transport, defence and leisure. 
• Future Flooding: developed a cross-disciplinary model for flood and coastal
erosion risk during the twenty-first century. It developed a range of scenarios
for the potential impacts of climate and socio-economic change.
• Brain Science, Addiction and Drugs: considered how we might manage the
use of psychoactive substances for the benefit of individuals, communities and
society in 2025. It explored what those substances might be in the future,
what their effects might be, and what methods we might have for managing
their use.  
Foresight has recently started its eighth project:
• Tackling Obesities: looking at the risk factors affecting different types of
obesity; the implications of obesity for the individual and society, and options
for managing those challenges. 
OSI Horizon Scanning Centre
The Horizon Scanning Centre (HSC) undertakes central strategic scanning for
future opportunities, risks, and developments across Government, helping
Government departments explore the implications of emerging trends and issues
identified in its Sigma Scan (full public policy spectrum) and Delta Scan (science
& technology). The HSC also supports departments in their own horizon scanning
activities through a programme of coaching and workshops. Further information
can be found at on: www.foresight.co.uk/horizonscanning
Details of all the reports and papers produced within this Foresight project
can be obtained from the Foresight website (www.foresight.gov.uk).
Any queries may also be directed through this website. The reports and
outputs of the project should not be taken to represent the policies of
any governments or organisations involved in the work.
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